Is This Humanity-V – Mahatma Gandhi

[Prof. Dr. Yogendra Yadav]

Prof. Dr. Yogendra Yadav

Senior Gandhian Scholar

Gandhi Research Foundation, Jalgaon, Maharashtra, India

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Is This Humanity-V – Mahatma Gandhi

 

A friend writes a long letter mentioning his difficulties and pointing out what Jainism has to say to him, a shrawak, in the matter. One of his questions is: You say that if we can neither take individual charge of roving dogs nor have a pinjrapole for them, the only alternative is to kill them. Does that mean that every roving dog should be killed, although it may not be rabid? Don’t you agree that we leave unmolested all harmful beasts, birds and reptiles, so long as they do not actually harm us? Why should the dogs be an exception? Where is the humanity of shooting innocent dogs whenever they are found roving? How can one wishing well to all living beings do this? The writer has misunderstood my meaning. I would not suggest even the destruction of rabid dogs for the sake of it, much less that of innocent, roving dogs. Nor have I said that these latter should be killed wherever they are found. I have only suggested legislation to that effect, so that as soon as the law is made, humane people might wake up in the matter and devise measures for the better management of stray dogs.

Some of these might be owned, some might be put in quarantine. The remedy, when it is taken, will be once for all. Stray dogs do not drop down from heaven. They are a sign of the idleness, indifference and ignorance of society. When they grow into a nuisance, it is due to our ignorance and want of compassion. A stray dog is bound to take to his heels if you do not feed him. The measure that I have suggested is actuated no less by a consideration of the welfare of the dogs than by that of society. It is the duty of a humanitarian to allow no living being aimlessly to roam about. In performance of that duty it may be his duty once in a way to kill some dogs. Here is another question: I agree that the dogs are sure to be killed by man whenever they become a menace to society. But you say, ‘To wait until they get rabid is not to be merciful to them.’ This means that every dog is potentially rabid and that therefore it should be killed as a matter of precaution. I met a friend from the Ashram who assured me that you did not mean this, and that you had suggested it only as a last resort when dogs had become a menace. This is not clear from your articles. Will you make it clear? My previous articles and my answer to the first question leave nothing to be cleared. I must explain what I mean when you say that you cannot wait on until the dog gets rabid. Every stray dog is harmful. The harm is not confined to cities alone and it must stop. We do not wait until the serpent bites us. The rabies of the dog is concealed in its capacity to bite. A friend has sent me figures of cases of hydrophobia treated in the Civil hospital, Ahmadabad: Cases Cases Period from the city from the district Total Jan. to Dec ’25 194 923 1,117 Jan. to Sept. ’26 295 695 990 these figures must alarm everyone who is interested in the welfare of the community, especially if he is a humanitarian.

I admit that all the cases may not have been of hydrophobia. But it is difficult to say whether a dog is or is not rabid, and many run in fear to the hospital, because most dogs are found to be rabid afterwards. There is only one remedy to relieve them of this fear and it is not to allow dogs to roam about. I was in England 40 years ago when effective measures were taken to stamp out rabies. There were, of course, no stray dogs there. But even for the dogs which had regular owners, an order was passed that dogs found without collars with the name and address of the owner thereon and without muzzles would be killed. The measure was taken purely in the public interest. Practically the next day all the dogs in London were found to be with collars and muzzles. It was, therefore, necessary to kill only a very few. If anyone thinks that the people in the West are innocent of humanity, he is sadly mistaken. The ideal of humanity in the West is perhaps lower, but their practice of it is very much more thorough than ours. We rest content with a lofty ideal and are slow or lazy in its practice. We are wrapped in deep darkness, as is evident from our paupers, cattle and other animals. They are eloquent of our irreligion rather than of religion. Here is a third question: You have different definitions of religion for the individual and for society. But why should not religion in both cases be the same? The ideal ought to be the same for both. That it may be impossible to carry it out is a different matter. For, even in case of the individual, only the occasion can show how far he has been able to carry out his ideal in practice. You yourself have said that your ideal is to save even a cruel animal at the risk of your life, but you could not say what you would actually do when faced by such an animal.

There is no reason why society should not similarly have a lofty ideal and leave the individuals free to practice it according to their capacity. My definition of religion for the individual and for society is the same. The ideal must always be the same, but the practice I have conceived to be different in the case of the individual and the society. Truly speaking, practice differs in case of every individual. I do not know of two men having the same extent of the practice of ahimsa, though their definition of ahimsa is the same. The extent of practice in case of society is the average of the different capacities of its members. Thus, for instance, where a section of the society is milkarian and the other fruitarain, the practice for the society extends to the use of milk and fruit. The writer next sets out two Jain doctrines as follows: Jainism is based on the doctrine of syadvada many-sidedness of reality as is aptly said: ‘No absolute rule is correct; only the relative rule is the correct rule.’ Which means that an act which may be described as himsa under certain circumstances may be ahimsa under other circumstances?

Man should always use his discrimination in determining his conduct. There are two classes of Jains. Sadhus (the monks) and shrawaks (the laity). Their code of conduct is thus defined: The sadhu is always non-violent. He may not eat to save himself, may not cook for himself, and may not walk even a step for his own purpose all his activity is for the welfare of the community and it should be as harmless as possible. He has to avoid the 42 infringements laid down in the Shastras. The sadhu is described as nirgrantha free from bonds. So far as I know there is no sadhu today who can satisfy the definition of a sadhu given above. The shrawak may not kill or injure any living being, except when it is essential for him. He is a worldly man and he cannot take his humanity farther than this. So if 20 per cent compassion is expected of the Sadhu, 1.25 per cent is expected of the shrawak. If the latter goes beyond the measure expected of him he approaches the state of a sadhu, but as a shrawak nothing more is expected of him. I knew the substance of this distinction. I am quite conscious that the Jain doctrine is not contrary to the opinion I have expressed in these articles. If the Jains accept the interpretation given above, the opinion expressed by me can be deduced from it. But whether they accept it or not, I humbly submit that my opinion is capable of being, and has been, independently justified.

 

Reference:

Young India, 11-11-1926