VICEROY’S SPEECH June 21, 1937

[Prof. Dr. Yogendra Yadav]

Prof. Dr. Yogendra Yadav

Gandhian Scholar

Gandhi Research Foundation, Jalgaon, Maharashtra, India

Contact No. – 09415777229, 094055338

E-mail- [e-mail];[e-mail]

 

 

VICEROY’S SPEECH June 21, 1937

 

 

 I dare say you will recall that when I spoke to you by wireless on the day I took charge of the office as Viceroy, I gave you my view that we should be wise not to expect that constitutional changes as profound as those into which we have now entered could come about altogether without difficulty. I want today to say a few words to you about those difficulties as they have emerged, and to try my utmost to make some contribution towards their final dissipation. As you read this message I would ask you to bear in mind two things. The first, that while I am truly anxious not to be more formal or technical than my task requires. I should not attempt to shorten too much or to oversimplify the various matters I propose to discuss. The second, that, even though my words may seem to you a little formal, this does not mean that my personal approach to these problems is in the least degree cold or unsympathetic. I have refrained hitherto from making any public statement of any sort on the constitutional issues which have been raised by the refusal of the party which commands a majority of the votes in the Legislatures to accept office in certain Provinces. My decision to do so was deliberate. A point has now, however, been reached at which it will, I think, be of advantage that, for the benefit of the man in the street and the ordinary elector, I should myself take up the threads of this discussion in the light of the statements which have been made in Parliament by the Secretary of State, and in individual Provinces by the Governors, and that I should state comprehensively, in the most formal and public manner open to me, my attitude, which is equally the attitude of the Secretary of State and of the Governor of every Province in India, on the constitutional issues which have been brought to the fore in connection with this question of office-acceptance. Three months ago a great political party which commanded in six Provinces a majority in the Legislature felt that, even with the support of the majority in the Legislature, it could not wisely accept office under the provisions of the Act unless it received certain specific assurances from Governors. Three months’ experience of the operation of the Constitution, short as I agree that that period is, has conclusively shown from the practical point of view that, any legal difficulties in regard to the grant of such assurances apart, those assurances are not essential to the smooth and harmonious working of the Constitution. Those three months have shown equally and beyond question that the apprehensions even if I see no foundation of fact for them that Governors would seek occasions for interfering with the policy of their Ministers or for the gratuitous and uncalled-for exercise of the Special Responsibilities imposed upon them by the Act to impede or challenge the Ministers in the day-to-day administration of the Province, have no shadow of justification. I have been intimately associated with the framing of the present Constitution The Act, and the Instrument of Instructions which must be read with the Act, have been approved by Parliament. Taken together, they represent the intention of Parliament and the Instruction given by Parliament to Governors. Those documents make it clear beyond any possibility of question that, under Provincial Autonomy, in all matters falling within the ministerial field, including the position of the Minorities, the Services, etc., the Governor will ordinarily be guided, in the exercise of his powers, by the advice of his Ministers and that those Ministers will be responsible not to Parliament but to the provincial Legislature. The only qualifications of this rule are in respect of certain specific and clearly defined matters. The most important of these are those known as the Special Responsibilities; and of those Special Responsibilities again, the most important are the prevention of any grave menace to the peace or tranquility of the Province or any part of the Province, the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the minorities and the securing to the Services and their dependents of any rights provided or preserved for them under the Act and the safeguarding of their legitimate interests. Within the limited area of his Special Responsibilities a Governor is directly answerable to Parliament, whether he accepts or does not accept the advice of his Ministers, but if the Governor is unable to accept the advice of his Ministers then the responsibility for the decision is his and his alone. In that event Ministers bear no responsibility for the decision and are entitled if they so desire publicly to state that they take no responsibility for that particular decision or even that they have advised the Governor in an opposite sense. But every Governor will be concerned to have the support of his Ministry or to know that he is not slightly at variance with his Ministry.  He will listen with a mind open to conviction to the arguments on the other side. If he regards those arguments as valid, he will modify his proposal on the other hand, as invalid, he will do his utmost, before taking a final decision, to convince the Minister or the Ministry of the soundness of the reasons for which he is unable to accept his or their view and if, in these circumstances, he still remains unable to influence their views in the direction he desires, he will take his decision and, before passing it, he will have exhausted all methods of convincing his Ministry that that decision was the right one, given the obligation imposed upon him by the Act. I welcome for this reason the helpful suggestion recently made by Mr. Gandhi that it is only when the issue between a Governor and his Ministers constitutes a serious disagreement that any question of the severing of their partnership need arise. “Serious disagreement” is a phrase which it is possible to define and to interpret in various ways. But the general sense is clear enough to anyone with any political or administrative experience. The matter involved must be of such really major importance. It must, I would myself say, be of such a character that a compromise was ruled out by a particular action taken against their advice by a Governor in the discharge of his responsibilities under the Act, despite the fact that Ministers had no direct or indirect responsibility for that action and that a Governor had taken the utmost pains to satisfy his Ministry that he had no choice in the discharge of his responsibilities but to take the action in question. I readily agree that where, on such an issue arising and where the Governor and his Ministers have both approached the matter, as I am confident that they would, with open minds and with a full sense of responsibility—the Governor, in so far as his Special Responsibilities are concerned to Parliament, the Ministry to the provincial Legislature-no agreement could be reached, then the Ministry must either resign or be dismissed. As between resignation and dismissal, normal constitutional practice leans very heavily indeed to the side of resignation. Resignation is more consistent with the self respect of a Ministry and is an effective public indication of the attitude of Ministers towards the action of a Governor. Resignation equally is an act taken spontaneously by a Ministry. Dismissal, more unusual by far in constitutional practice, might seem to carry with it some suggestion which we are concerned at any cost to eliminate from the new constitutional arrangements. I ought perhaps to add that the suggestion that the Governor should in certain circumstances demand the resignation of his Ministers is not the solution provided by the Act, so that it will not be possible for Governors to accept it. Both resignation and dismissal are possible, the former at the option of the Ministers and the latter at the option of the Governors. But the Act does not contemplate that the Governor’s option should be used to force the Minister’s option and thus to shift the responsibility from himself. I have deliberately dealt with the extreme case of a conflict involving resignation or dismissal, for it is the extreme case on which attention has been riveted. I feel no doubt whatever myself that on that basis deadlocks need not be anticipated in view of the anxiety of all Governors, to which I can myself testify, not merely not to provoke conflicts with their Ministers, to whatever party their Ministers may belong, but to leave nothing undone to avoid or to resolve such conflicts. I have been the more concerned to set out in some detail the position, as I see it, in that it is essential that those interests or communities or areas to which the Act extends the assurance of the Special Responsibilities should not, for a moment, think, or have the least ground for thinking, that any question will arise of sacrificing their interests for political reason. What I am concerned to make clear is that, without any threat to those interests or any sacrifice of them, a Governor and his Ministers can, in my judgment, hope, within the provision of the Act, to operate the Constitution in the normal manner which the Act envisages and to avoid, save in circumstances which I find it not easy to contemplate, fundamental differences of opinion such as to endanger the relation between the Governor and his Ministry in that very limited area in which special obligations and responsibilities are imposed upon a Governor. . . . Before I take leave of you, I feel that you would wish me, setting aside all technicalities, to speak to you for a moment or two as one who has had a good deal of Parliamentary experience and some share in the shaping of the new Constitution. Some of you, I know, hold and hold strongly, that the plan of reform does not go sufficiently far in the direction of complete self-government. I do not question the sincerity with which that view is held. But I am certain that every responsible person, in deciding his position on this vital matter does so with a genuine anxiety in the best interests of India to take a balanced view and to reach a right decision as to what may best be done in the conditions of this time to serve those interests. Let me at once assure you that in my best judgment and given goodwill on all sides this Constitution will work and that in experience it will be found to work well. It stands now as the law of the land. It stands too—and despite all the criticism that has been levelled against it as the only complete and homogeneous scheme of political reform now before the country. I am convinced that the shortest road to that fuller political life which many of you so greatly desire is to accept this constitution and to work it for all it is worth. Of their nature, politics are ever dynamic and to imagine that their expression in terms of a written Constitution can render them static would be utterly to disregard the lessons of history and indeed the dictates of common sense. Again, it is my firm conviction that this Constitution will be found to offer immense opportunities for beneficent public service and in this connection I may venture a word upon a matter very close to my heart. It is my conviction that in the full working and development of this Constitution lies the best hope for that general and lasting amelioration in the condition of the rural population and of the humbler sections of society which all of us so ardently desire. The discussions and debates of the last two months have, I think, placed before you every argument and point of view that bears upon this issue. The choice a choice fraught with so much of profound significance for the future of India—must shortly be made. I hope with all my heart that all, whether leaders or their followers, may find it their duty to choose the way of constructive effort. Whatever emerges, you may count upon me, in face even of bitter disappointment, to strive untiringly towards the full and final establishment in India of the principles of parliamentary government. But if what I should regard as deplorable outcome should emerge from the present situation and if parliamentary and responsible government should, as a consequence, be suspended in a number of Provinces, it might, however much we might all of us regret it, be beyond the power of any of us rapidly to reverse the circumstances that must then supervene. In that event invaluable time will be lost, and I greatly fear, no little hurt inflicted upon the cause of progressive reform. But I do not believe that these sad things will come to pass, for I have faith in you and in the destiny of India. The way we tread may seem dark and sometimes difficult. The star that guides our course may seem sometimes to flicker and almost to fall. Yet faith and courage are mighty forces. Let us summon them to our aid in this difficult hour and together move steadily towards the fulfillment of our hopes.